JUDICIAL ACTIVISM THROUGH THE LENS OF LEGAL THEORY: NAVIGATING THE TENSIONS BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY

Abstract

Judicial activism is a contentious legal theory, representative of the dynamic tension between judicial interpretation, legal authority, and shifting societal values. This paper analyzes judicial activism from the philosophical theories of natural law, legal positivism, and modern legal thought, considering how different viewpoints shape judges' functions in legal decision-making. Natural law theorists like Aristotle, Aquinas, and John Finnis hold that judges have a duty to override unjust laws in order to enforce higher ethical principles. Legal positivists like Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and H.L.A. Hart hold that law should be applied strictly in line with its formal sources, warning that judicial activism can undermine legal certainty and institutional stability. The paper further takes into account Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz's sophisticated positions, which address the conflict between legal interpretation and judicial discretion. While Dworkin's 'law as integrity' approach supports moral argument in legal decision-making, Raz is a proponent of judicial restraint to maintain legal legitimacy. These positions are alternative expressions of the underlying conflict in judicial activism: should courts be agents for social progress or should they uphold legislative intent in a strict manner? This paper argues that judicial activism has to balance legal certainty and moral responsiveness in a manner that ensures that the judiciary is a defender of basic rights and a pillar of legal stability. By combining legal theory and judicial practice, this research determines the role of judicial activism in democratic government and legal system evolution.