امام زرکشی رحمہ اللہ کے اصولی منہج کی روشنی میں قیاس پر اعتراضات کا تجزیہ

An Analysis of the Objections to Analogical Reasoning (Qiyās) in the Framework of Imam al-Zarkashī’s Legal Methodology

Abstract

Analogical reasoning (Qiyās) holds a central place in Islamic jurisprudence as a means of deriving rulings for new cases based on established principles. However, not every Qiyās is accepted as valid; its soundness depends on its structure, the appropriateness of the ‘illah (legal cause), and the consistency between the original case and the new case. Often, specific analogies contain errors or flaws in application, which lead scholars to raise objections—not to the principle of Qiyās itself, but to its incorrect use in a particular instance.Imam Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794 AH), in his seminal work al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, compiled and critically examined such objections with remarkable depth and precision. His discussion provides a rigorous framework for evaluating analogical arguments and identifying where a given Qiyās may go wrong in its practical or structural formulation.This article presents an analytical study of the objections recorded by al-Zarkashī that target the implementation of Qiyās rather than its legitimacy. It explores each objection’s definition, categories, examples, and al-Zarkashī’s responses, highlighting his critical methodology and contribution to legal theory.This research deepens our understanding of Qiyās not only as a tool of inference but also as a domain of nuanced scholarly critique. It is particularly beneficial for jurists and students of Usūl al-Fiqh seeking clarity on how analogical errors are identified and addressed within the Islamic legal tradition.